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AbstrAct: this article attempts to explain the ambiguous association of Lacanian psychoanalysis 
with materialism. resisting attempts to divide Lacan’s work into discrete periods, i argue that, 
throughout his work, Lacan was concerned with articulating aspects of language and subjectivity 
that resist incorporation into networks of idealised meaning or sense, and that it is this emphasis 
on the materiality of language, routed through the concept of the real, that makes up the 
particular ‘materialism’ of Lacanian theory. the emergence of this strain of thinking is located 
in Lacan’s radical reworking of freud’s theses on primary narcissism.
Keywords: Lacan; Psychoanalysis; Language; the real
the question of the continuing value of varying kinds of materialism is central to much 
work in continental philosophy today. the materialist legacy in political philosophy 
continues to provide a rich source for the analysis of contemporary capitalism, while 
slavoj Žižek, adrian Johnston and others are seeking to ‘materialise’ the legacy of 
German idealism through an attention to the psychoanalytic theory of Jacques Lacan, 
and in particular through his theory of the subject.1 this paper argues, through a 
reading of a number of early texts by Lacan, that it is only through an attention to the 
conceptual genesis of the category of the real that the materialist potential of Lacanian 
theory may be fully realised. the real, i argue, is to be taken not as something extra-
symbolic, but as an overdetermining function that is materialised only through the 
particularity of the symbolic and imaginary registers. further, i argue that it is through 
Lacan’s complex philosophy of language, and especially through his insistence on the 
withdrawal of signifiers from networks of relation, that the real becomes material, as 
constitutive as it is disruptive of the subject. at one and the same time, psychoanalytic 
theory, i argue, allows us to put into question the very validity of such oppositions as 
     1. see, for instance, s. Žižek The Sublime Object of Ideology, London and new York, Verso, 1989; a. Johnston 
Žižek’s Ontology : A Transcendental Materialist Theory of Subjectivity, evanston, northwestern university Press 
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subject/object, material/ideal, imaginary/symbolic, with the real as the conceptual 
vehicle through which a more general psychoanalytic ontology skeptical of the prevailing 
binaries of contemporary thought might be realised.
the value in such questioning, distinct as it is from the meta textual dislocation af-
forded by deconstruction, is locatable as much in the disciplinary position of psycho-
analysis, as it is in the specificity of its conceptual innovations. Psychoanalysis remains 
an interstitial discipline, caught between its clinical manifestations and the vast influ-
ence it has had upon the contemporary academy, especially in its Lacanian guise. the 
disjunction between clinical practise and academic psychoanalytic theory, while fre-
quently the source for dispute and accusation among psychoanalysts and researchers, 
is nonetheless generative of various kinds of productive misunderstandings and cross-
pollinations. Philosophy and psychoanalysis have, of course, entertained an ambiguous 
relationship since freud, with his supposedly disavowed debts to schopenhauer and ni-
etzsche, and for all Lacan’s protestations that his discourse was intended solely to ground 
the practise of analysis, there is little doubt in my mind that Lacanian theory sits at a use-
fully awkward angle to the mainstream of contemporary continental thought, reposing 
questions that might otherwise remain caught in the orthodoxies of the reproduction of 
philosophy as a discipline unto itself.
indeed, as i will argue later, Lacan might be better understood as a non- if not anti-
dialectical thinker, concerned with the paradoxical productivity of aporias and what 
we might call the weird materialism of the signifier, something i’ll return to. it is worth 
asking, though, whether, in all of Žižek’s proclamations of a specifically Lacanian mate-
rialism centred on the non-all of nature, on the constitutive incompleteness of matter2, 
the full philosophical implications of Lacan’s materialism, if it is a materialism, have 
yet to be mined, particularly as it relates to the undermining in Lacanian theory of the 
notion of language as something supposedly ‘extra-material’, or ideal. it is, in part, due 
to a prevailing orthodoxy in the contemporary reception of Lacan’s thought, one that, as 
well as isolating the real conceptually from the symbolic and the imaginary registers, iso-
lates the real periodically as central only to the latter stages of Lacan’s teaching, that the 
potential of Lacanian materialism has yet to be fully addressed. as a result, it is impor-
tant to reconnect these different stages of Lacan’s work, in particular to address the im-
manence of the real to the articulation of the imaginary and the symbolic. Just as psy-
choanalysis’ critical potential results as much from its disciplinary position, so Lacan’s 
potential lies as much in the ways his work has been schematised to render it assimilable 
to existing academic logics.
to over-simplify somewhat, Lacan’s teaching is frequently divided into early, middle 
and late periods, with distinct emphases and theoretical breaks progressing, we’re often 
told, in a more or less linear fashion. the early Lacan, according to this narrative, was 
concerned with the elaboration of the imaginary, the formation of the ego being read 
via a reading of hegel’s master/slave dialectic, and by a psychoanalytic recasting of hei-
degger’s Logos as the manifestation of a self-referencing ego, persistently under threat 
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from the very elements that provoke its composition. the middle Lacan, by contrast, is 
said to be the Lacan of the symbolic, of the logic of the signifier, for whom the subject 
is an effect of the metaphoric and metonymic movements of language. finally, the late 
Lacan of the 1970s shifts to the real, the indissoluble limit of interpretation which para-
doxically grounds the subject in its fleeting consistency, coiled around the indivisible, 
material singularity of her symptom.3 any productive reading of Lacan as a material-
ist, i want to claim, must begin by rejecting this teleological approach to Lacan’s teach-
ing. instead, it is the overdetermination of the category of the real over the totality of 
the Lacanian seminar, early to late, and the complicated alliances the real continually 
enacts and dissolves with the imaginary and the symbolic, that acts as the locus of a 
specifically Lacanian materialism 
such a claim is not necessarily in contradiction with Žižek’s recent proclamations 
of materialism. in his The Parallax View from 2006, Žižek contends that ‘materialism 
means that the reality i see is never ‘whole’—not because a large part of it eludes me, 
but because it contains a stain, a blind spot, which indicates my inclusion in it’.4 here 
and elsewhere, Žižek’s materialism seems to amount, in fact, to a post-Lacanian attempt 
to transcend any sharp distinction between materialism and idealism, such that the inclu-
sion of the subject within the putatively objective sphere results not in a common variety 
skepticism or solipsism but rather in the materialisation or objectification of the subject 
itself, the recognition of the status of the subject as elusive object in the visual field; the 
distribution of the subject, that is, between and over any subject/object opposition. ref-
erences to topological figures abound in such theorisation precisely because the aim is 
to sneak past, around, or over the insistence on a symmetrical, or even asymmetrical 
divide between subject and object, between matter and logos. despite this, Žižek’s read-
ing of Lacan frequently restates a supposed exteriority of the real to the symbolic, even 
if he is also liable to insist on the absolute immanence of the real when it will further 
his wider argument.5 By rooting our understanding of the real within the logic of the 
signifier we may begin to recognise the materiality of the immaterial, and the stubborn 
opacity of the material itself. Lacan’s claim that it is through the signifier that this ma-
teriality is revealed to us should not be taken as a concession to any standard brand of 
anti-realism or hyper-textualism; to the contrary, Lacan’s aim is to render superfluous 
any neat separation of the ideal from the material, from the representative to that to 
which it ostensibly refers.
from his work in the 1930s on aggressivity and narcissism onwards, Lacan was keen 
to identify the limit point around which the movements of imaginary misrecognition 
and symbolic identification fail. More precisely, Lacan wished to isolate those elements 
that provide both the limit point, a point of failure, and a simultaneous point of consis-
     3. an illustrative example of this claim can be found in dany nobus, Jacques Lacan and the Freudian Practise 
of Psychoanalysis, London, routledge, 2000, p. 84. nobus’ claim that ‘Lacan’s concept of the real had scarcely 
outweighed that of common-sense reality during the first ten years of his seminar’ is demonstrably untrue 
and blocks an understanding of the potentiality of Lacan’s real.
     4. s. Žižek, The Parallax View, p. 17.
     5. see, for example, s. Žižek, Enjoy your Symptom!, 2nd ed., London, routledge, 2008, p. 63.cosMos and historY 158
tency to the subject of the unconscious. in the imbroglio of primary narcissism, and in 
his theorisation of the aggressive ambivalence of the image of the other in the forma-
tion of the ego, Lacan far exceeded the logic of supersession inherent to hegelian phe-
nomenology and familiar to us from hegel’s master/slave dialectic, positing the image 
of the other, or ideal-ego, as an aporetic failure of self-completion or self-identity that, 
nonetheless, provides the only ground for the birth of the subject. in the very earliest of 
Lacan’s seminars, and contrary to the typology of development outlined earlier, Lacan 
insists on the complex interrelationship between imaginary and symbolic, such that the 
development of the ego, situated principally in the domain of the imaginary, requires 
isolated, proto-symbolic elements, what i want to call signifiers-in-isolation, to map the 
fragile emergence of an alienated subjectivity.
early in his 1949 presentation of the Mirror stage, Lacan emphasises the primacy 
and temporally primary importance of what he calls the ‘symbolic matrix’ into which a 
child is born.6 We might think of this matrix in terms of the name chosen for the child 
even before birth, and the opaque parental desire such a choice may signify, but at a 
more formal level the presence as constitutive background of a pre-oedipal, nascent 
but nonetheless crucial level of symbolic abstraction acts as a further factor in rendering 
the child susceptible to alienation in the image. Lacan argues that it is only through the 
prior curving of subjective space, the beginnings of what will become the ‘logic of the 
signifier’7 that outside/inside, self/other distinctions might begin to impinge upon the 
senses, to be fixed at the level of the imaginary in the ideal-ego qua image of the other. 
Lacan’s thinking here is in sharp distinction to the prioritisation in phenomenology of 
the act of a transcendental consciousness; husserl’s post-Kantian emphasis on the syn-
thetic activity of consciousness ignores, for Lacan, the prior symbolisation necessary for 
phenomena to become meaningfully present to the subject. there is, even in 1949, no 
contradiction for Lacan in arguing that the child’s ‘jubilant assumption of his specular 
image by the kind of being—still trapped in his motor impotence and nursling depen-
dence—the little man is at the infans stage thus seems to me to manifest in an exemplary 
situation the symbolic matrix in which the i is precipitated in a primordial form’.8 that 
is, the primacy of the image is sustained by a minimal symbolic level, registering at the 
egoic level what Lacan will later define as the ‘materiality’ of language in its earliest in-
stance, the signifier abstracted from relations of meaning, reduced to an abstract form 
of placing or coordination. 
elsewhere in the ‘Mirror stage’, Lacan will refer to the result of imagistic identi-
fication as a ‘finally donned armour of an alienating identity that will mark his entire 
mental development with its rigid structure’9, but this minimal interplay between a na-
scent symbolic matrix and the image of the other (or, to put it in more formal Lacanian 
terms, the beginnings of an asymmetric dialectic between the other and the big other 
     6. J. Lacan, Ecrits, trans. Bruce fink, new York, W. W. norton, 2006, p. 94-101.
     7. Jacques alain-Miller most fully developed the concept of a ‘logic of the signifier’ in his article La Suture 
cahiers pour L’analyse 1, Paris, Winter 1966.
     8. Lacan, Ecrits, p. 76.
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of the symbolic) points, i think, to an ontologically primordial instability in the shifting 
registers that Lacan identifies in human subjectivity. Just as, at this early stage, the child 
is caught between the bodily reality of fragmentation and displacement and the relative 
fixity of scopic identification, so at a more abstract level the very first elements of sym-
bolic placing10 point to the eventual, if only partial, capitulation of the ego to the rupture 
of the symbolic unconscious. even after the resolution of the oedipus complex, the an-
tagonism between imaginary formations and symbolic co-ordinates can be identified 
as a primary source of anxiety for the subject, and the subtle implication of the impor-
tance of the ‘symbolic matrix’ even at this early stage in child development provides an 
early glimpse of this. By the point at which objet petit a has emerged out of the concept 
of the ideal-ego, it is the radical instability of surplus desire that is posited by Lacan as 
the result of imagistic identification, rather far from any notion of the imaginary as a 
suturing function. 
Many of the conceptual innovations that will, in later seminars, be associated with 
the real are birthed here; the ambivalent image of the other, providing both the impe-
tus and threat to the subject’s emergent identity, and codified as the ideal-ego, will later 
give rise to objet petit a, the object-cause of desire, the image of the other reduced to a 
non-specularisable blind spot, an absent cause structurally unlocatable in symmetri-
cal topographies of self and other. it is worth considering, in turn, the ways in which 
Lacan’s early reflections on the relationship between the logic of the signifier and the 
real extend this double logic of imaginary into a general economy of a psychoanalytic 
ontology predicated on the overdetermination of the real.
When, in his third seminar on the Psychoses, Lacan emphasises the particularity of 
the psychotic’s relationship to language, he will draw conclusions that bear on a more 
general philosophy of language, and one particularly cognisant of the materiality of the 
signifier. the psychotic, Lacan argues, suffers from a fault in the paternal function or 
the paternal signifier, such that the normally multidimensional character of the sym-
bolic is reduced to the closed, dyadic logic of the imaginary.
Lacan succinctly introduces his thesis on psychosis as follows : 
Prior to all symbolisation—this priority is not temporal but logical—there 
is, as the psychoses demonstrate, a stage at which it is possible for a portion of 
symbolisation not to take place. this initial stage precedes the entire neurotic 
dialectic, which is due to the fact that neurosis is articulated speech, in so far as the 
repressed and the return of the repressed are one and the same thing. it can thus 
happen that something primordial regarding the subject’s being does not enter 
into symbolisation and is not repressed, but rejected.11 
if, then, neurosis is predicated on the repression of a signifier or chain of signifiers, psy-
chosis represents a more radical rejection or, to the use the term Lacan uses through-
     10. i hesitate to refer to this as a form of symbolic spatialisation; it is, i think, only with the installation of 
the name of the father and the full accession to the symbolic that the significatory logic of space becomes 
primary for Lacan, even as subjective space has been prefigured through the dyadic form of the imaginary.
     11. J. Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book 3 1955-1956 : The Psychoses, trans. russell Grigg, new York, 
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out his third seminar, foreclosure. that which is foreclosed is the paternal signifier, the 
name-of-the-father, or the full institution of the third element or law that breaks up the 
proto-psychotic dyad of the imaginary relation. the psychotic’s relation to language is, 
then, constitutively and logically determinant of her post-oedipal being. for the neu-
rotic, alienation in language concomitant with primary repression, the final separation 
that ends, or at least displaces, the imbroglio of primary narcissism, constitutes a contin-
gent and precarious removal from the proximity of the real qua antagonism. for the 
psychotic, by contrast, even such a meagre ‘protection’ from the real is unavailable. 
the question remains, however, whether such a proximity to the real for the psychotic 
occurs entirely outside the logic of the signifier or whether it is within the logic of signifi-
cation that we might find the real in its relation to the psychotic. Lacan will equivocate 
on this, but it is my contention that the latter thesis is the more predominant, and least 
acknowledged, facet of Lacan’s theory of language. the wager of this paper, moreover, 
is that the account of the complex relation between language and psychosis offered by 
Lacan in his third seminar offers us a more general sense of how language is always al-
ready implicated in an asymmetrical relation of overdetermination with the real.
the more popular thesis outlined above, whereby the separation of the real from 
the symbolic is maintained by reference to the supposed rejection of post-oedipal ac-
cession in psychosis, has often been associated with one of the most cited passages in 
seminar three. in a discussion of freud’s case of the Wolf Man, Lacan outlines how an 
early hallucination described by freud of the cutting of a finger with a knife, an episode 
that the Wolf Man is unable to recount in speech, illustrates the thesis that ‘what is re-
fused in the symbolic order re-emerges in the real’.12 We are led, initially, to believe, as 
Lacan baldly states it, that ‘he [the Wolf Man] has rejected all means of access to cas-
tration...all access to the register of the symbolic function’.13 Just a few lines down, how-
ever, Lacan nuances his position, claiming that what is at stake is a ‘range, a series, of 
relations’ between the symbolic, the real and the subject’s hallucination, what Lacan 
‘provisionally calls the subject’s history in the symbolic’.14 Lacan goes on to indicate 
his hesitation and caution—’i don’t know whether i shall retain this combination of 
terms’—before concluding that ‘the origin of the neurotic repressed is not situated at the 
same level of history in the symbolic as that of the repressed in psychosis’.15
What is at stake in Lacan’s cautious appraisal of the Wolf Man’s hallucination, and 
perhaps the reason for his uncharacteristic theoretical caution here, is precisely the 
wider implications of his theory of psychosis for his theory of the interrelation of the 
symbolic and the real. We see Lacan inching here towards a recognition, made more 
explicit elsewhere, that the symbolic—presupposed even in the predominantly imagi-
nary domain of egoic identification—is the necessary background of a certain theory of 
signification for even those psychic processes most associated with the real of mental 
     12. Lacan, The Psychoses, p. 13.
     13. Lacan, The Psychoses, p. 13.
     14. Lacan, The Psychoses, p. 13.
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disintegration. as quoted above, Lacan needs to insist on the ‘history’ of the subject’s 
relation to the symbolic as such, we are enjoined to suppose that such a history is ir-
revocable, even as he distinguishes between the ‘levels’ of such a history in neurotic or 
psychotic structures. to do otherwise would be to render his account of oedipal devel-
opment and the subsequent generalisation of the imaginary/symbolic relation incoher-
ent; as we have seen, the narcissistic appropriation of the image of the other is theoreti-
cally impossible without the minimal co-ordinates of a pre-oedipal symbolic mapping, 
made concrete in Lacan’s reflections in his fifth seminar on the importance of the par-
ents’ verbal encouragement of the baby’s narcissistic jubilation in the face of her mirror 
image. the isolated co-ordinates of a proto-symbolic ensure that the image of imagi-
nary narcissism succeeds in interpolating the nascent subject.
this relation between the real of the Wolf Man’s hallucination and the symboli-
cally-enabled imaginary identification of the ego is made explicit by Lacan soon after 
the reflections quoted above. discussing the nascent ego, Lacan remarks that ‘one’s re-
lationship to the ego is fundamentally ambiguous, one’s assumption of the ego is always 
revocable. in the psychotic subject on the other hand certain elementary phenomena...
show us the subject completely identified with his ego, with which he speaks, or with 
the ego assumed entirely along instrumental lines’.16 here, the implicit importance of 
Lacan’s insistence on the importance of the ‘symbolic history’ becomes explicit, but only 
if we recognise that the aspect of the symbolic Lacan is invoking here is not that of the 
integrated, post-oedipal relationality of signification, what Lacan refers to here as ‘full 
speech’, but those problematically isolated and insistent signifiers dispersed among the 
movements of primary narcissism. here, we come to recognise that, far from the sym-
bolic being radically foreclosed or revoked by the phenomena of psychosis, the rejection 
of the paternal signifier makes operative and primary those real aspects of significa-
tion—which is to say, signifiers torn away from the negative constitution of meaningful 
communication and tied to the aggressive movements of primary identification—that, 
as we shall see, must be presupposed, if kept at bay, for any signification to be operative 
for the subject. as Lacan says, ‘it’s as if a third party, his lining, were speaking and com-
menting on his activity’.17 this mysterious ‘lining’, i propose, is nothing but the symboli-
cally mandated split caused by the necessity of the identification with the image of the 
other, an image that is finally inseparable from the isolated, opaque signifiers that sup-
port its operation.18
to speak of a subject’s ‘lining’ is to bring into question the barrier between self and 
other, between inside and outside. it is through the introjection of alienating images of 
the other that such a boundary qua ego is constructed, but it is also predicated on a 
     16. Lacan, The Psychoses, p. 14.
     17. Lacan, The Psychoses, p. 14.
     18. serge andre usefully reconnects Lacan’s complicated theoretical reflections on the Wolf Man to freud, 
a reconnection i will myself attempt below. andre emphasises the ‘pre-historic reality’ of the psychotic sub-
ject for freud, a pre-history that is recoded by Lacan as the persistence of the intertwinement of a degraded 
and dissipated symbolic with the movements of primary narcissism. see What Does A Woman Want by serge 
andre, new York, other Press, 1999, p. 2.cosMos and historY 162
minimal level of unconscious symbolic identification, even if such an identification can 
only be attached to pre-oedipal, which is to say opaque, signifiers. such signifiers, ex-
emplified by Lacan but not limited to the affirmative (or otherwise) noises parents make 
when watching a child in front of its reflection, provide a minimal and only level of co-
ordination for the nascent subject. the implication of Lacan’s argument here is that, for 
the psychotic, such a minimal coordination is all that can be guaranteed; with the pa-
ternal law being foreclosed, only the closed dyadic logic of the imaginary can prevail, 
even as it is supported by the signifier at its most opaque and non-relational. for the 
common variety neurotic, which by the end of Lacan’s teaching must be considered to 
be anyone who has acceded fully to the symbolic, the dyadic logic of demand that ac-
companies primary narcissism has been nuanced with the metonymy of desire in the 
signifier; desire, properly speaking, is absent for the psychotic precisely by virtue of the 
lack of a full installation of the paternal law. 
 if the general mark of a fully functioning symbolic is the ability to lie whilst telling 
the truth—to, in other words, make full use of language’s multidimensionality, its ironic 
structure—the psychotic is a prisoner of the literal, bereft of the metaphoric potential 
of communication. in furthering his discussion, in part through a reading of the famous 
case of Judge schreber’s paranoia first discussed by freud, Lacan distinguishes between 
what he calls ‘two levels’ and sometimes ‘two layers’ of signification present in the dis-
course of the psychotic, and he emphasises the prominence of one layer in particular, 
what Lacan will sometimes call the ‘letter’, defined in his early ‘ecrits’ as the material 
substrate of the signifier, the ‘material support that concrete discourse borrows from 
language’.19theoretically, the Lacanian account of these two levels of discourse—that is, 
the isolated letter or signifier-in-isolation, extracted from the relations of negative refer-
ence that ultimately give meaning to language—and the signifier as it primarily exists 
in non-psychotic discourse, embedded in structures of relationality and in metaphoric 
concatenations of meaningfulness, point us back to Lacan’s account of primary narcis-
sism. in the following quote from his third seminar, Lacan describes the peculiarity of 
schreber’s use of neologisms, commenting that: ‘the meaning of these words that pull 
you up has the property of referring essentially to meaning as such. it’s a meaning that 
essentially refers to nothing but itself, that remains irreducible...Before being reducible 
to another meaning it signifies within itself something ineffable, it’s a meaning that refers 
above all to meaning as such’.20
such a description could equally apply to the comments Lacan makes, as discussed 
above, on the importance of proto-signifiers, signifiers-in-withdrawal from relation, in 
the construction of the nascent ego, prior to the onset of the oedipus complex. We find, 
in other words, a continuity between these often falsely isolated stages of Lacan’s teach-
ing, that of the famous article on the Mirror stage and his other pioneering work on 
primary narcissism in the 1940s and the later, supposedly hyper-structuralist seminars 
that focus, we are told, on the symbolic. for both periods of Lacan’s teaching, a sub-
     19. Lacan, Ecrits, p. 413.
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strate of the signifier, described as material and indivisible and implicated as the ground 
to the artifice of imaginary recognition, exists as the primary element in the theoretical 
elucidation of subjectivity. furthermore, this principle quality of the signifier, what i’m 
calling the signifier-in-isolation and what Lacan will elucidate through the coining of a 
number of conceptual terms—unary trait, letter, master-signifier and finally the symp-
tom recast as the ‘sinthome’—figures as real, in the sense that Lacan always gave it 
from 1953 onwards. the real, that is, as the element that always returns to its place, that 
admits of no mediation, and that finally disturbs any neat division of subject and object, 
self and world, perhaps even life and death.
What are the wider implications of these arguments for a potential psychoanalytic 
materialism? first, we must recognise that it is within language, that supposed domain 
of polysemy, of the final break between human and thing, subject and object, that Lacan 
locates a stubborn materiality, resistant to relation in a way similar, if only superficial-
ly, to the description Graham harman frequently gives of the withdrawal of (real) ob-
jects.21 if harman’s objects withdraw, Lacan’s signifiers—so frequently glossed in terms 
far closer, in fact, to derrida than Lacan himself—do so, paradoxically, because of the 
sheer multiplicity of attachments that they can make, but breaking from such a po-
tentiality, persisting in the unconscious and accruing sympotamal weight even as they 
break away from metonymic relations. the signifier gains in power, that is, the more it 
withdraws from relation. When derrida himself, and his students Jean-Luc nancy and 
Lacoue-Labarthe, accuse Lacan of a covert linguistic idealism,22 we have to ask whether 
their argument takes full cognisance of this paradoxical materiality of the signifier, its 
shrinking away from, and disruption of, subjectivity, even as it supports the only basis 
upon which, through the imbroglio of primary narcissism, subjectivity can begin to 
build.
What is revealed here, i think, is an immanent transcendence in Lacan’s work of 
the limits of a structuralist, or post-structuralist approach to the movements of signi-
fication. far from the saussurean idealism so often imputed to him, Lacan’s concern 
for the material characteristics of signification widens the ontological scope of his psy-
choanalytic theory, such that our understanding of what divides the material from the 
ideal, the present from that which is represented, is fundamentally disrupted. in the 
1970s, when Lacan will come to redefine the psychoanalytic symptom as situated in the 
real, as the meaningless self-referentiality that grounds the subject’s divided being, we 
see the recapitulation within a different theoretical space of his very earliest reflections 
on language.23 here, the limitations of popular typologies of Lacan’s teaching, the sup-
posed movement from the imaginary, to the symbolic, to the real, become very clear. 
to articifically impose such a schematics of development on Lacan is to miss the ever-
     21. G. harman, Prince of Networks : Bruno Latour and Metaphysics, Melbourne : re-press, 2009, p. 151-233.
     22. see J. derrida, The Postcard : From Socrates to Freud and Beyond, chicago, chicago university Press, 1987, 
p. 411-497; J-L. nancy and P. Lacoue-Labarthe, The Title of the Letter : A Reading of Lacan, albany nY : 
sunY Press, 1992.
     23. J. Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book 23 : Le Sinthome, trans. Luke thurston (unpublished manu-
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presence in his work of a concern for the psychic efficacy of the most material elements 
of the supposedly ideal space of a linguistic subjectivity—that is, for the thorough inter-
penetration of the ideal with the material, the material with the ideal. 
When, in his 23rd seminar, Lacan turns to the work of James Joyce, he does so be-
cause he recognises in Joyce a thorough explication of the material unmeaning of isolat-
ed signifiers and the occasional, in Joyce’s late work epiphenomal, irruption of meaning 
from such a senseless ground. Meaning and unmeaning, sense and non-sense, collide 
here in the neologistic experimentations of Joyce’s prose, a prose that reveals to us the 
material ground of signification that in other, less overt contexts, may remain hidden.24 
By extrapolating, however, from such an account of language, already present in his 
very earliest work as i’ve emphasised, to a more general concept of a material symp-
tom, whereby the subject’s very consistency is dependent on an inherently meaningless 
and self-referential point or insistence, Lacan marks out the terrain of a materialism ex-
panded beyond the limits of a theory of signification and gesturing towards a renewed 
psychoanalytic ontology. 
it is as if, by developing his theory of the ‘sinthome’ in the 1970s, the symptom recast 
as real, Lacan has taken what he had previously assumed to be a materiality localised 
in signification, and raised it to the function of a quasi-transcendental condition for 
Being as such. there, Lacan redefines the symptom as ‘the way in which each subject 
enjoys the unconscious, in so far as the unconscious determines him’.25 Just as sense relies 
on material non-sense, so psychoanalytic Being relies on a singular point of non-Being, 
uniting in its insistence what might otherwise scatter and skid on the movements of the 
signifier. What unites such a putative ontology are, i think, those elements, resistant to 
dialectical recuperation, indivisible and insistent, that Lacan groups around the idea 
of the real. that these elements are constitutive of the Symbolic as much as they are 
external to signification, that they are present in Lacan’s early reflections on primarcy 
narcissism and the mirror stage, is to be taken as the surest sign that a Lacanian ontol-
ogy is rather less concerned with the hypostatisation of symbolic lack, with any kind of 
post-Kantian insistence on the inviolability of the in-itself beyond the text, as it is with a 
thoroughgoing materialist immanence that troubles the borders between the materially 
and ideally existent. they do not, it should be emphasised again, mark the final triumph 
of the text over its referent or the subject over the object, precisely because they signal 
a repudiation of the very distinction between subject and object, logos and matter, such 
that an object-like insistence provides the ground for both meaning and psychoanalytic 
being as such. 
at any rate, what such an ontology would refuse is the reduction of the question of 
materialism purely to ‘matter’ as object of science, or to the priorities of a scientific or 
naturalist realism.. further, what i hope my reflections offer here is a sense of the in-
ternal potential of Lacanian theory to generate its own conceptual innovations. recent 
work by adrian Johnston and others to establish links between psychoanalyis and neu-
     24. Lacan, Le Sinthome, unpublished manuscript.
     25. Lacan, Le Sinthome, unpublished manuscript.toM eYers 165
roscience are welcome, but it’s important too to recognise the benefits inherent in the 
theoretical resources Lacan offers. it may well be that Lacan’s innovations around the 
question of materiality and the signifier require a language wholly apart from that of 
‘materialism’ and ‘idealism’—Lacan’s increasing turn in his later years to topology re-
flects, i think, his own frustration with prevailing analytical languages—but for now the 
invocation of the material, imperfect as it, serves to capture some of the non-dialectical 
obstinacy of the real. 
further, and as i’ve suggested, the development of such a paradoxical material-
ism through Lacanian theory may provoke productive alliances and suggestive disjunc-
tions with a variety of contemporary theoretical trends, perhaps most promisingly with 
the renewal of interest in an althusser-derived rationalism and with the mathematical 
ontology of alain Badiou. the benefits of recent thinking around the question of an 
object-oriented ontology26 and the debates on the blogosphere and elsewhere as to the 
benefits of a speculative realism27 have been in the insistence on the importance of non-
human agency, and psychoanalysis i think, particularly when we question the supposed 
extricability of language from the world, the symmetry of a human/non-human topog-
raphy, offers a complementary discourse centred on those aspects of existence that slip 
between binaries of human and non-human, life and death, material and ideal. this ar-
ticle has illuminated one aspect of that theoretical legacy, the inextricability of material 
signifiers in the real of psychoanalytic ontology. if there is commonground to be found 
between those philosophers keen to dethrone the human as the sole source of the sub-
ject/object relation and psychoanalysis conceived as materialist ontology, it is perhaps 
through the sheer intransigence of the materiality, no matter how substantially different, 
with which both traditions of thought have to contend. 
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